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Education Reform and the Political Safeguards of Federalism

I.

INTRODUCTION
The passage of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001 sparked widespread

controversy over the federal government’s proper role in public education. Opponents criticized
the legislation as an unprecedented federal intrusion on state and local governments’
policymaking authority.

Whereas previous incarnations of the Elementary and Secondary

Education Act (ESEA) required local schools and districts to comply with detailed rules about
how to spend categorical funds, federal moneys were never before made contingent on a rigorous
testing and accountability regime. By requiring annual testing and tying federal funding to
student outcomes, the new legislation signaled a shift in the federal government’s role vis à vis
subnational governing bodies.
This shift in authority led some to question whether state and local governments’
structural protections from federal overreaching are dead—at least in the field of public
education. In The Political Safeguards of Federalism, Herbert Wechsler argued that because
states’ rights are preserved through the legislative process, the Supreme Court need not intervene
to protect states from federal regulatory intervention. The legislative process shelters state
autonomy, Wechsler argued, by ensuring that federal legislation must gain the approval of the
Senate, which is responsive to state interests, the House, whose congressional districts are
dictated by state legislatures, and the president, who depends on states through the Electoral
College system. According to critics, congressional acquiescence in President George W. Bush’s
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drive for top-down standards-based reform (SBR) demonstrates the failure of these traditional
safeguards.
Beginning in the 1990s, the Supreme Court stopped deferring to federal regulatory
authority and began striking down legislation it deemed overly intrusive. According to the
Court, national political institutions had failed to protect state interests, thus necessitating a more
robust role for the judiciary in preserving the delicate balance between state and federal interests.
Because federal legislators are under pressure to solve pressing national problems but are not
responsible for implementation, they will inevitably pass the buck to state representatives by
voting for coercive, unfunded mandates. Bipartisan support for NCLB brought together the likes
of Representative Tom DeLay, a fierce opponent of federal intervention who once sought to
eliminate the Department of Education, and liberal Democrats such as Senator Edward Kennedy,
lending support to the Supreme Court’s more aggressive stance. It could be argued that federal
representatives arrived at a legislative compromise without seriously considering NCLB’s impact
on a broad spectrum of state and local constituents.
In response to mounting criticism of Wechsler’s theory, Dean Larry Kramer has
developed an alternative version of the political safeguards framework. He posits that the
political party system itself protects states from federal intrusion because each party has
representatives operating at multiple layers of government, all of whom are mutually dependent.
According to this theory, representatives at the national level must respond to local and state
concerns in exchange for political support, thus producing a natural check on federal
encroachment. Dean Kramer further characterizes the proliferation of bureaucratic agencies
beginning with the New Deal as an additional political safeguard of federalism. Like national
political parties, regulatory agencies link federal, state, and local administrators together because
4
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the federal government relies on administrators at lower levels of government to implement
policy.
Dean Kramer’s revived political safeguards theory has interesting implications for the
education field because of the unique role that politics and bureaucracy have played in the
promulgation and implementation of federal education legislation. In this paper, I will apply
Kramer’s political safeguards thesis to four educational reform movements: a New Deal Youth
Program, administrative progressivism, the ESEA, and the modern standards-based reform
(SBR) movement culminating in NCLB. Specifically, I will draw on educational reforms of
these four periods to explore the extent to which bureaucracy and the party system can
successfully mediate disputes over the division of power between local, state, and federal
government.
I will begin by comparing the role of bureaucracy in furthering or frustrating federalist
aims in education governance under President Roosevelt’s New Deal and President Johnson’s
Great Society. Then, I will consider the role of party politics in federal education reform, from
progressives’ attempt to depoliticize the field to the political consensus embodied in NCLB.
II.

BUREAUCRACY AS A POLITICAL SAFEGUARD
a. Bureaucracy and New Deal Youth Programs
Amid the flurry of federal legislation aimed at propping up a devastated economy during

the Great Depression, there was a surprising paucity of support for general aid to public
education.

Despite professional educators’ calls for federal assistance, President Franklin

Roosevelt was reluctant to provide financial support to existing state education agencies. He
firmly believed that education should be controlled at the local level, and that federal aid could
5
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be used more effectively to tackle economic woes directly.

Foreshadowing contemporary

education reformers who question the marginal utility of aid to education, Roosevelt believed
that the problems in education were “inevitably bound up with economic conditions” and so
“[t]he best way for your national government to assist state and local educational objectives . . .
is to tackle the national aspects of economic problems.” (Smith 1982)
In keeping with this philosophy, the president backed New Deal programs such as the
National Youth Association (NYA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), which were
established as autonomous federal programs operating outside of professional educators’
jurisdictional control. Although the NYA and the CCC were not educational agencies per se,
they took on an increasingly educative mission that alarmed the state and local education
establishment. For instance, the CCC was established in 1933 under the auspices of four federal
departments (Labor, War, Agriculture, and the Interior) to provide training for young men by
employing them in natural resource conservation work. (Hendrickson 1976) However, soon after
the Corps’ founding, the United States Education Commissioner lobbied for a more robust
educational program within CCC camps. The CCC director, together with General MacArthur,
resisted the Commissioner’s efforts and favored a marginal role for education in light of the
CCC’s original focus on employment and conservation.

Despite their protestations, the

Commissioner secured approval to add an educational component to the CCC, and by 1938, over
ninety percent of Corps enrollees were attending classes as part of a well-developed educational
program.
Because the CCC was a federally-funded program existing outside the influence of state
and local education agencies, professional educators felt threatened by the growing importance
of the Corps’ educational mission. The CCC was self-aggrandizing at their expense in what they
6
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perceived as a zero-sum game for organizational control. In 1941, the National Education
Association and the American Association of School Administrators warned that the federal
government was using the NYA and the CCC to establish permanent nationwide education
programs that could usurp local and state control. Whereas the federal government had in the
past “worked through the established state-and-local agencies of education, supplied financial
aid, sought to give leadership, yet refrained from control,” the federal government was now
seeking to bypass local government in an attempt to exploit the education system. (Gower 1967)
Rather than integrate the educational components of the CCC and NYA within the
existing state and local educational apparatus, the president and other federal government
officials sought to create a youth organization that would be insulated from traditional educators’
sphere of influence. Proponents of the New Deal programs questioned state educators’ ability to
address the pressing needs of marginalized youth, as illustrated by University of Chicago
Professor of Education Dr. Charles H. Judd, who queried, “’Did the schools show in 1933 and
1935 the slightest insight into the youth problem or any disposition to take care of people who
are out of school or out of work?’” (Gower 1967) The CCC’s cumbersome administrative
structure ceded control over educational programming to administrative agencies such as the
U.S. Army and the U.S. Forestry Service, which favored work training over educators’ vision of
a “complete educational experience.” (Hendrickson 1976)
The New Deal generated an alphabet soup of federal regulatory agencies that exercise
control over state and local government. While the resulting federal bureaucracy initially gave
rise to fears of federal preemption of state and local control, Dean Kramer argues that the New
Deal’s bureaucratic structure plays a supporting role in federalism by giving voice to state and
local administrators. Congress depends entirely on state and local administrators to implement
7
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policies. Moreover, Congress “cannot abandon politically popular programs.” The resulting
“mutual dependency guarantees state officials influential voice in the lawmaking and budgetary
process.” (L. D. Kramer 2000) Kramer goes on to argue that federal officials are receptive to
state and local concerns in part because many of them began their careers at lower levels of
government within the same administrative bureaucracy.
Interestingly, the New Deal-era youth programs described above do not fit into this
“interlocking” model of bureaucracy.

Rather than furthering federalist aims in education

governance, the bureaucratic structures with an educational focus established during the New
Deal frustrated state educators’ attempts to capture federal aid and influence federal
policymaking. First, the CCC did not foster mutual dependency between state and federal
administrators.

Instead of relying upon these administrators to oversee or implement the

program, the federal government launched a relief effort through overlapping federal agencies,
none of which was traditionally responsible for education.

State-level officials from the

Departments of Labor, War, Agriculture, and the Interior who were charged with administering
the CCC did not answer to those within the education establishment. Moreover, the Education
Commissioner’s efforts to bring the program under the control of the Office of Education proved
futile. As such, educators were cut out of the administrative system at the federal and state level.
The fleeting nature of Depression-era reforms further weakened states’ bargaining
position vis à vis the federal government. Programs like the CCC were ostensibly launched as
emergency relief efforts designed to help young men devastated by the Depression get back on
their feet. While educators feared a permanent role for the CCC, they faced an uphill battle in
persuading the federal government that assistance for the temporary program should be
channeled through education agencies. Like a tent city built in the wake of a natural disaster, the
8
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CCC emerged outside the traditional locus of control. A series of articles written in 1940 and
1941 by CCC proponents confirmed educators’ fears that federal officials sought a more lasting
role: the national educational director of the CCC called for a “shift of emphasis in the CCC”
arguing that the CCC is “an essential part of the American educational structure.”

An

educational advisor added, “the CCC should be made compulsory for all American boys, with
the federal government accepting responsibility for training the youth.” (Gower 1967) In the
end, the build-up to war, together with ongoing tensions within the program, led to its demise.
b. Bureaucracy and The Elementary and Secondary Education Act
Beginning in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson put education reform at the top of the
national agenda for the first time under the banner of his comprehensive War on Poverty, thus
ending a decades-long stalemate over federal aid to education. (Manna 2006) (E. DeBray 2006)
Nevertheless, the president had to contend with a feeble bureaucracy at both the state and federal
level. The U.S. Office of Education lacked the capacity to lead the reform effort, and state
education agencies (SEAs) lacked the capacity to implement federal policy at the local level.
(Graham 1984) (Ellis 1983, 358)1 The federal officials on the Gardner education task force were
left with one alternative: build up state-level bureaucratic capacity while simultaneously
delegating to SEAs the authority to channel federal funds to local school districts. (Manna 2006)
Title V of the ESEA emerged as the primary tool for building institutional capacity at the state
level. The provision set aside a portion of federal funding to assist state education departments

1

According to Graham (1984), the Gardner Task Force responsible for outlining President Johnson’s education plan had little
faith in the state education agencies: “If, from the elite viewpoint of the BOB, the Office of Education was a third-rate
bureaucracy of report writers, statistics gatherers, and professional ‘educationists,’ the state departments of education were
regarded by USOE and by many task force members with equal disdain.”; Ellis (1983) notes that in 1962, only 10 SEAs had a
total staff of more than 100, and 21 had fewer than 50.

9
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in laying a bureaucratic foundation that could support the ESEA and other federal initiatives.
(Thomas, Education in National Politics 1975)2
The categorical approach to funding embedded in the structure and goals of Title I was
politically savvy in that the special needs categories slated for funding existed in every
congressional district. (Kirst and Wirt 2001) However, categorical aid soon faced criticism on
several fronts, two of which are particularly relevant to the safeguards of federalism. On one
hand, the legislation handcuffed local educators, who were not afforded discretion in how to
allocate spending. An underlying justification for categorical aid as opposed to block grants was
the need to ensure that specific funding streams reached the children who needed the money
most. In light of the vast disparity in educational funding at the local and state level, Title I was
built on a fundamental sense that states and districts could not be trusted to spend the money on
disadvantaged students. (Kirst and Wirt 2001) (Elmore and McLaughlin 1983, 309) 3 The
Johnson administration’s management approach “reflected a fear that local political concerns
would divert Title I funds to less needy children” and thereby controvert the overarching purpose
of the Act. (M. W. Kirst 1984) This fear that Title I funds would “spill over” to non-Title I
students resulted in the creation of a “separate administrative apparatus . . . composed of state
and local Title I coordinators whose allegiance was different from, and sometimes counter to,
that of supporters of a district-wide or statewide core curriculum.”

Those charged with

implementing the reform at the ground level could not incorporate Title I services into the

2

Thomas (1975) notes that “some have argued that Title V was meant to placate state education officials who objected to direct
federal grants to LEAs authorized under Titles III and IV on the ground that they weakened the supervisory authority of SEAs.”
See also (Cross 2004) (commenting on the difficulty of funding capacity-building in human-service programs, given the public’s
aversion to supporting the salaries of bureaucrats rather than expanding services).
3
Kirst (2001) hones in on the central sticking point, writing, “This dispute over state versus local control really centers on two
values—central equity and local choice.”

10
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general curriculum, and so categorical aid generated a middle-level bureaucracy that reflected
the fragmented funding environment in which it operated. (McDonnell 2008) (Timpane 1978)4
In addition to the practical constraints imposed on street level bureaucrats charged with
administering categorical grants, the fiscal autonomy and enforcement role of state
administrators placed them at odds with local administrators. Most state officials charged with
distributing federal funds and ensuring compliance owed no allegiance to state or local
administrators because they were financed almost entirely by the federal government. This
phenomenon drove a wedge not only between state and local officials, but also between staff
carrying out different mandates within districts and even within schools. Federally funded
teachers and administrators working at all levels of the system came to be viewed as federal
agents who were “poorly linked to the classroom world below.” (Ellis 1983)5 (McDonnell 2008)
By constraining local educators’ flexibility and insulating SEAs from the local and state
governance structure, Title I of ESEA arguably wrought a system based more on compliance and
enforcement than on cooperation. Taken as whole, however, the legislation produced a system
which, as compared with the administrative structure of the New Deal youth programs, better
comports with Kramer’s political safeguards theory. Three components of the ESEA support the
theory that bureaucracy furthers the interests of federalism: mutual dependency, capacity
building, and interest groups.

4
See also (M. W. Kirst 1984) (“Categoricals developed largely in isolation of each other, which rapidly led to a local and state
disease called ‘hardening of the categories’. Most of the categoricals initially were not directed at the core classroom technology
for curriculum and instruction. Special education and Title I, for example, relied significantly on “pull-out” programs that were
not integrated well with core subject instruction.”); Kaestle and Smith, 1982.
5
Ellis (1983) describes clusters of federally funded teachers and staff as constituting “a little ‘federal world’ in each school
system and possibly within each school. In the schools, it was not unusual to find federally funded teachers and aides in their
own sections of the building where materials were housed and children were taught without significant continuing contact with
the regular staff.”
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First, federal officials depended on local teachers and administrators—members of the
education establishment—to implement the ESEA, whereas the New Deal administrators strove
to insulate their programs from educators’ influence.

As noted above, federally-financed

teachers and staff did not always work in tandem with other teachers, but the fact that the ESEA
was embedded in the existing education system produced a more integrated bureaucracy as
compared with the CCC. The federal government’s dependence on lower-level administrators
was further enhanced by the fact that the ESEA is a permanent federal program, as opposed to a
temporary emergency effort in response to a national catastrophe. The permanence of ESEA in
the national consciousness distinguishes the legislation not only from New Deal programs, but
also from previous categorical aid programs designed to address an immediate contingency—for
example, the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which was passed against the backdrop of
Cold War.6 Although the ESEA technically cast states and local agencies as the “servants” in a
master-servant relationship, or as “agents” in a principal-agent relationship, the federal
government’s total reliance on subnational organizations enhances the power and autonomy of
street-level bureaucrats. (Gerken 2009)7 Because the federal government has no choice but to
delegate power to experts below, state and local officials retain an informal veto power over
federal policies and have some discretion in how they accomplish their task. As a result, policy
outcomes are refracted through a set of “institutional priorities, capacity, management
preferences, and demands.” (Gerken 2009) (Elmore and McLaughlin 1983) Mutual dependency
also enables state and local officials to push back against federal reforms that are unworkable at
the local level and negotiate for better terms. (Nugent 2009)
6

The title of the NDEA invokes the national security concerns it was designed to address: the legislation was passed in response
to the Soviet launching of sputnik, and authorized funding to elementary and secondary education in the areas of mathematics,
science, and foreign languages.
7
The authors discuss “the power of the servant” which state and local government derives from the federal government’s
dependence on state and local administrators. See also (Metzger 2008) (“responsibility for program implementation and
enforcement appears to enhance state influence over federal agency decision making”).

12
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Second, in order to delegate implementing authority to lower levels of government, the
Johnson administration recognized the need to strengthen local and state education agencies.
Title V of the Act was aimed specifically at building capacity at the state level so that SEAs
could properly implement the ESEA and other federal programs.

Whereas the New Deal

programs for youth located administrative authority in disparate federal departments having little
to do with education, the ESEA embeds state and local education agencies within a single
interlocking system of educational governance such that multiple bureaucratic layers become
mutually reinforcing. (Metzger 2008)8 Although the interests and priorities of the resulting web
of agency specialists may not align perfectly with those of the state governor and legislature, the
bonds created between bureaucratic levels serve as a buffer against federal overreaching. This
phenomenon, often termed “picket fence federalism,” is especially prominent where specialists
are more involved in agenda setting and shaping at the state level than are political figures.
(Nugent 2009, 28)

State-level bureaucrats’ role in shaping ESEA implementation can be

contrasted with the education establishment’s marginal impact on the CCC during Roosevelt’s
presidency. At that time, the education establishment vociferously protested the New Deal
strategy—but did so as an outsider to the system. Although their outsider status gave them the
freedom to speak openly against the federal government and left them “untainted by any
association with the policies they were criticizing,” educators and administrators suffered from a
lack of “knowledge of the system and personal relations with the people best positioned to
change the policy.” (Gerken 2009)

Because educators were not embedded in the CCC

educational programming, they perceived every advance made by CCC advisors as an incursion
on their domain in a zero-sum competition for control. Although the Johnson administration
8

Metzger (2008) argues that “agency structure also appears relevant, with regional offices offering an opportunity for developing
closer state-federal relationships and sensitivity to state interests. Such close relationships may create internal agency support for
paying attention to state needs that could counterbalance the states’ loss of external access to federal decision makers.”
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expressed lingering doubts as to the states’ willingness or ability to fulfill Title I’s anti-poverty
goals, the federal government had made considerable advances by the 1960s toward a federalstate cooperative partnership. Paul Manna has described how modern iterations of federal
intervention in education are better characterized as a process of “borrowing strength” whereby
the federal government builds capacity at the state level and then relies on states to implement
policy. He argues that construing federal-state relations as a zero-sum game misses “the ways
federalism can enable actors at all levels of government simultaneously.” (Manna 2006) The
Johnson administration’s focus on capacity building and its willingness to delegate a degree of
control to state and local actors produced a degree of collaboration, and enabled the federal
government to rely more heavily on state agencies leading up to the SBR movement.
Finally, the ESEA categorical approach produced a plethora of interest groups that were
previously excluded from education policymaking. Once offered a voice in the process, these
constituencies fought to retain their gains, and thus emerged as an enduring fixture in the
education landscape. Newly empowered interest groups further strengthened the balance of
power between various bureaucratic levels by both exploiting their differences and reinforcing
similarities. Constituencies seeking to further their educational goals benefit from multiple
access points to the educational bureaucracy. If they disagree with federal policy, interest groups
can exploit and thereby reaffirm the vertical separation of power between federal and state
administrative agencies. Conversely, interest groups who lobby in favor of a particular policy at
the local, state, and federal levels forge ties with sympathetic administrators throughout the
system, thus enhancing the interdependency of multiple layers of the system.
III.

PARTY POLITICS AS A POLITICAL SAFEGUARD

14
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In the same way that bureaucracy forges ties between federal, state, and local officials,
Kramer argues the “American system of decentralized national political parties . . . link[s] the
fortunes of federal officeholders to state politicians and parties and in this way assure[s] respect
for state sovereignty.” (L. D. Kramer 2000) Given that education is often characterized as
“above politics,” what hope do state and local actors have of influencing education
policymaking? Kramer’s theory has interesting implications for education precisely because
education is a thoroughly political issue wrapped in a thin apolitical veil. In this section, I will
consider the role of party politics in three waves of education reform: First, I will focus on
administrative progressives’ attempt to strip education of its political roots so as to confine the
field to the realm of experts. Second, I will discuss President Johnson’s effort to reinsert politics
into education by advocating for federal aid as a hallmark of the Democratic Party platform.
Lastly, I will discuss Republican presidents’ evolving education strategy, which culminated in a
legislative compromise—NCLB—that broke the Democrats’ monopoly over the politics of
education. These three eras serve as a helpful comparative sample for testing Kramer’s political
safeguards theory because they indicate the gradual politicization of the field of education over
the last century.
a. Party Politics and Administrative Progressivism
School governance reformers associated with the administrative progressive movement
began in earnest to dismantle the political spoils system in education at the turn of the twentieth
century as part of an overall effort to establish professional control over education. (Ravitch and
Vinovskis 1995) Timar explains in The Institutional Role of State Education Departments that,
“[i]nstead of developing as a differentiated branch of state government in which the civil society
vested authority for educational decision making, state education bureaucracies became
15
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dominated by professional interests” including school district administrators and professors of
education. (Timar 1997) Professionals, not the general public, were therefore the primary source
of state and local educational reform—and most progressive reforms were designed to
concentrate professionals’ authority.

The public was further shut out of the policymaking

process by the administrative progressives’ effort to depoliticize the field of education. (Cibulka
2001)9 By “equating professional control with the common good,” progressives were able to
contain policymaking within their own sphere of influence. 10 They operated outside the
politically responsive legislative branch and so were untouched by pressure groups.

Dean

Kramer notes that progressivism is one among several “[s]uccessive waves of reform [that]
maimed and nearly killed [the party system] over the course of the twentieth century’s first six
decades.” (L. D. Kramer 2000) The professionals in charge of education essentially constituted a
single-issue political party with a homogenous and well-disciplined constituency. And yet, the
progressives’ political purity made them weak in the face of federal intervention, as evidenced
by their inability to convince federal officials during the New Deal to channel federal aid through
the regular public education system. At the time, the “regular” public education system belonged
to the progressives, and they had worked hard to depoliticize the field. As a result, education
reformers in favor of New Deal funding could not tap into political connections at the federal
level. Ironically, by protecting their turf through depoliticization, the progressives may have
made themselves more vulnerable to unwanted federal intrusion.
b. Party Politics from the 1950s to the Great Society
9

Cibulka (2001) writes, “Educational Progressivism . . . always has had a dim view of politics. Despite their claims to neutrality,
Progressives favored a particular style of politics. This political belief system can be aptly called professional autonomy . . . . By
formally separating school boards from municipal government in most jurisdictions, Progressives made possible the operation of
school systems under strong professional influence. They sought an institutional framework that would assure less of a role in
our schools for corrupt politicians, the parochial interests of neighborhoods (compared with the broader community), and the
self-interests of parents.”
10
School administrators saw themselves “as the embodiment of the public interest, its vigilant protector.” (Cibulka, 2001)

16
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By the 1950s, the progressives’ cult of professionalism gave way as those outside the
education establishment began to question the effectiveness of the existing system. Public
support for federal aid to education swelled after the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957. A
pervasive sense that the U.S. was slipping behind galvanized reform efforts in the area of math
and science, leading to passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA). (Cibulka 2001)
To implement the NDEA, the federal government channeled funding through non-governmental
agencies, thereby circumventing the professional-dominated SEAs. Like the New Deal youth
programs before it, the NDEA was therefore designed with an eye toward decreasing the
“establishment’s” influence over federal aid.
Although the 1950s-era reforms loosened the professionals’ stranglehold on
policymaking, the influence of party politics did not gain momentum until the 1960s. Politicians
were reluctant to take a strong stance on education prior to the 1960s in part because the political
coalitions making up the Democratic and Republican Parties were sharply divided over the issue
of federal aid. In The Limits of Reform, Gilbert E. Smith traces a series of bills in support of
federal aid for education that failed as a result of political stalemate. (Smith 1982) Prior to the
ESEA, the “three Rs”—race, religion, and Reds—repeatedly stymied action at the federal level:
“To many Americans, federal aid meant enforced integration, unconstitutional support of
parochial schools, and excessive government control of people’s lives.” (Dallek 2004) These
three interrelated issues crossed ideological and party lines and poisoned successive efforts to
secure federal aid.

17
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Before Johnson triggered a mass exodus of southerners from the Democratic party by
signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Thomas, Education in National Politics 1975)11 and Voting
Rights Act of 1965, it was still an open question as to whether the federal government could tie
funding to racial integration efforts. (E. DeBray 2006) As such, any federal representative
seeking to block federal education legislation could simply insert an amendment requiring
integrated schools. However, the race issue was removed as a major obstacle to legislation when
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made funding contingent on desegregation efforts. (Thomas 1983)
In addition to segregationist southerners, Catholic constituents further complicated the
Democratic Party’s stance on federal aid to education. Federal funding for education could not
overcome the second “R,” religion, until Democrats reached a compromise that would offend
neither Catholics seeking aid for religions schools nor Protestants and secularists bent on
maintaining a strict separation of church and state.

President Johnson’s child-centered

approach12 to federal aid offered Catholic groups, represented primarily by the National Catholic
Welfare Conference (NCWC), supplemental materials such as textbooks, instructional materials,
and equipment. (Thomas 1975)

The compromise fell short of extending to Catholics full

participation in federal assistance programs, but was enough to win their support. Lastly, states’
rights advocates’ fear of the “Reds” was diminished by the emerging consensus in the 1960s that
the federal government had an important role in fighting poverty and protecting minorities from
prejudiced state institutions. By focusing the legislation on aid for disadvantaged children,

11

Thomas (1975) writes, “The Civil Rights Act of 1964 furnished another weapon in the campaign for desegregation. Title VI of
that landmark statute required federal officials to terminate financial assistance to any state or local government practicing
discrimination in programs or activities receiving federal funds.”
12
President Johnson’s approach built on the “child benefit theory,” articulated in two Supreme Court cases which held that
providing aid to parochial schools does not violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment as long as the primary effect
of the aid is to benefit the child rather than a religious organization. Everson v. Board of Education, 310 U.S. 1 (1947); Cochran
v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The Supreme Court invalidated direct aid for the purchase of
secular educational services in Kurtzman (1971).

18
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/thebridge/vol3/iss1/3

18

Sharma: Education Reform and the Political Safeguards of Federalism

advocates of the ESEA subsumed the bill within the overarching War on Poverty and thereby
defused the controversial specter of federal control.
With both houses of Congress firmly in Democratic control, a legislative agenda that
included the Civil Rights Act, and astute political maneuvering, the Johnson administration
managed to walk a precarious tightrope between the traditional pitfalls of federal educational
reform in order to pass sweeping education legislation. Although opponents of federal aid to
education continued in their efforts to curtail programming under the ESEA, the legislation
produced a number of influential interest groups who fought to maintain what they had gained
under the Act. With education at the top of the national agenda, those interest groups who
benefitted from ESEA compensatory education services were politically empowered and found a
new voice in educational policymaking. Members of the burgeoning educational bureaucracy at
the local, state, and federal level provided additional support for ESEA reauthorizations.
Together, these proponents of the ESEA and other Great Society legislation helped to sustain
Democratic control in the House and Senate until 1981. The resulting “iron triangle” linking
interest groups with their allies in Congress and the educational bureaucracy emerged as a nearly
invincible force that helped to sustain Democratic control in the House and Senate until President
Reagan swept to power in 1981 under the banner of “New Federalism.” (Thomas 1983, 285) (E.
DeBray 2006)
By establishing federal aid to education as a national priority and then vesting authority
over the system in specialists at the federal, state, and local level, the Democratic Party captured
the education field and managed to fight off Republican opposition to the burgeoning
administrative system.

The Johnson administration thus marks a stage in the politicization

process at which the political parties were not yet fully capable of fulfilling their role as
19
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safeguards of federalism. Parties serving in their capacity as federalism buffers should empower
state and local politicians to resist federal policies they find overly interventionist. And yet,
Republicans at various levels of government who opposed, for instance, categorical funding for
students with special needs had little influence at the federal level so long as the Democratic
Party dictated the terms of the education debate.
c. Party Politics Culminating in NCLB
President Reagan promised a dramatic devolution of power from the federal government
in a broad range of policy areas, including education. However, aside from enacting a budget
reconciliation that merged a number of categorical programs into a block grant, his efforts to cut
back on federal aid were largely unsuccessful. After education’s debut as a national political
issue in the 1960s, it was impossible for “New Federalists” to simply put the genie back in the
bottle. (Elmore and McLaughlin 1983)13 Education had earned a lasting place in party politics,
and bipartisan support for a federal role withstood the opposition of Republican Presidents
Nixon, Ford, and Reagan. Rather than simply denying the legitimacy of federal aid altogether,
the Republican Party would have to advance a set of forward-looking policies. Ironically, by
advocating for the destruction of the education bureaucracy in the name of federalism, the
Reagan administration failed to capitalize on party politics, one of the primary safeguards of
federalism.

The administration’s propensity for budget cuts left the education ball in the

Democrats’ court and brought “stalemate, sullenness, and ‘conventional warfare,’ rather than
grand new strategies and cataclysmic battles.” (Finn 1983, 392) If the president had instead
embraced education’s new status as a deeply political issue and formulated a set of distinctly

13

Elmore and McLaughlin (1983) urge against the temptation to believe that one can simply “return to an earlier, simpler era” by
sharply reducing federal involvement. The authors point out that “[a] tremendously complex network of fiscal, political, and
administrative dependencies has grown up among the federal, state, and local levels since 1965.”
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Republican policies, party members at all levels of government might have had an opportunity to
turn the education debate to their advantage. Instead, it was left for future Republican presidents
to seize on the politics of education. President George H. W. Bush perfected the new trend when
he bypassed the education establishment and cultivated the energy and ideas of the business
community and the nation’s governors in 2001. (E. DeBray 2006)14
For many, NCLB signaled a fundamental shift in federal-state relations. It was one thing
to enforce compliance with categorical funding requirements, as in the original ESEA, but quite
another to attach funding to a stringent testing regime that applied to all students. The transition
to standards-based reform at the national level was all the more surprising in that it was
championed by a Republican president. Since Reagan’s “just say no” policy in the early 80s,
Republicans had managed to craft an effective message focused on choice, local control, and
deregulation in order to compete with Democrats on the education policy front. (E. DeBray
2006) Despite their ideological consistency up until the Bush presidency, Republicans seemed to
abandon all pretenses of protecting state and local interests by towing the NCLB line in the name
of party unity.
A closer analysis of the process leading up to NCLB’s adoption reveals a more nuanced
story, however. The legislation was less a coup for federal regulators and more a product of
lobbying by state-level politicians who were interested in seizing control over education policy
from the federal bureaucratic system put in place during the Johnson administration.

As

discussed above, the ESEA strengthened state bureaucratic actors by giving them a hand in
influencing education policy, but simultaneously weakened state political actors by insulating
14

Debray (2006) provides an illustrative quote from Glen Chambers, an aide to Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), a member of
the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee at the end of Clinton’s second term: “Republicans have started to really
kind of cut their teeth on this issue . . . all of the sudden you have an aggressive, conservative education agenda as opposed to just
a ‘let’s-shut-down-the Department of Education’ agenda.”
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federal programs from their control. Most SEAs operated as autonomous arms of the federal
government because they were financially—and thus politically—independent of the state
legislature. Meanwhile, state governors and legislatures had little authority over how SEA funds
were distributed in their state. The legislation built state capacity but within an institution that
was, in many ways, detached from the political branches of government. By the 1970s, school
finance litigation forced states to shoulder more of the responsibility for enhancing and
equalizing financial support for public schools. (Fuhrman and Elmore 1990) Naturally, state
demands for greater control over education policy followed fast on the heels of increased
expenditures. Governors and state legislatures were no longer willing to give state education
agencies free reign over implementing federal policy, and they began demanding greater
accountability in exchange for state resources. (Cibulka 2001) (Manna 2006)
The 1989 national education summit in Charlottesville, Virginia touched off this new era
in education governance in which governors and state legislators took the policymaking helm
and in so doing, spurred reform at the local and federal levels. (Fuhrman and Elmore 1990)
(Kirst and Wirt 2001) As a self-fashioned “Education President,” George H. W. Bush called the
meeting with the nation’s fifty governors to discuss public education. To Bush’s surprise, the
governors came to the meeting with their own agenda for education reform involving the
national education goals, and they persuaded the president to go along. (Manna 2006)
Symbolizing the shift from federal to state leadership, the governors insisted that federal officials
not dominate the National Education Goals Panel (NEGP), which was formed to oversee the
standards movement nationwide. The governors’ accountability scheme became a fixture of the
federal education platform under President Bill Clinton, who in 1994 incorporated the plan into
“Goals 2000” (which helped states create standards and accountability systems) and the
22
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/thebridge/vol3/iss1/3

22

Sharma: Education Reform and the Political Safeguards of Federalism

reauthorization of ESEA as the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA). (Manna 2006)
President George W. Bush took the process one step further in advocating for accountability
under No Child Left Behind.
NCLB defied the prevailing partisan divide in Washington by bringing elements of the
Democratic and Republican parties together under the standards based reform umbrella. This
surprising turn of events might seem to demonstrate the failure of the party system to accurately
represent state interests in the federal arena. However, NCLB was a direct outgrowth of state
governors’ efforts to tie state funding for education to student outcomes. It might be that
governors—and by extension Presidents Clinton and Bush, who gave voice to their concerns—
were more politically attuned to the wishes of the general public than were federal
representatives who sought to either maintain the status quo or abolish the Department of
Education.

Moreover, governors are in a better position than state bureaucrats to resist

legislation they deem overly restrictive. Governors are highly visible political actors who must
respond to state concerns and can wield a great deal of influence at the federal level.
Organizations like the National Governors Association (NGA) and the National Conference of
State Legislatures can effectively lobby the federal government for state-friendly administrative
regulations, and therefore serve as powerful federalism watchdogs. (E. DeBray 2006, 67) Just
as state and local bureaucrats are empowered to resist federal mandates, political actors at the
state and local level can draw on their party membership to convince federal office-holders to
retreat. A prime example of this involves state and local officials’ ability to convince the federal
government to relax many provisions of NCLB that they viewed as too stringent or simply
unworkable.
IV.

Conclusion
23
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The long-running debate over the federal role in education reform seems to have shifted
from whether to how much. Depending on where one falls on the political spectrum, the
supposedly staggering increase in federal power may be a positive or negative development.
And yet, before giving up the federalist system for dead, it is important to identify the built-in
mechanisms that preserve the delicate balance between state and federal authority. By applying
the political safeguards theory to the question of federal intervention in education, I have shown
that bureaucracy and party politics have produced a mutual dependency that in turn protects state
sovereignty. The applicability of Kramer’s theory to the field of education should reassure those
for whom federalism is of primary concern. However, this discussion begs the question of
whether the safeguards of federalism are a good thing. The bureaucratic and political shields
against federal encroachment might protect state jurisdictional control to the detriment of
individual students, or at the expense of a national consensus about the underlying purpose of
public education.
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